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The youngest people alive today and all future generations have something in 
common: they will suffer the greatest consequences of climate change, yet they have no 
voice in the political process with which to defend themselves. In response to political 
inaction, motivated young people take their activism to the courts or to the streets. This 
thesis examines the growing movements of youth-oriented climate litigation and 
activism that both appear reframe climate as an issue of justice. Specifically, I focus on 
Juliana v. United States, the 2015 lawsuit coordinated by Our Children’s Trust in which 
21 youth plaintiffs accuse the federal government of willfully violating their 
fundamental rights, in order to show how a lawsuit can frame its legal arguments to 
make a compelling argument even beyond the courtroom. This research contributes to 
the fields of climate law and activism by drawing connections from litigators to activists 
to demonstrate how Juliana can be viewed as another aspect of the growing wave of 
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On October 29th, 2018, a crowd braves the rain to gather in front of the Eugene, 
Oregon federal courthouse. A banner announces the even to be in support of the “Trial 
of the Century.” At the microphone, 11-year-old Levi Draheim leads the crowd in a 
chant: “though our leaders are silent, let the youth be heard” (Draheim, 2018, 0:18). 
Eighteen-year-old Journey Zephier invokes the Due Process clause of the Constitution 
to warn that “climate change threatens the life, liberty, and property of not just my 
generation, but everyone” (Zephier, 2018, 22:10). These are just two of the 21 youth 
plaintiffs who partnered with non-profit Our Children’s Trust (OCT) in 2015 to file a 
lawsuit called Juliana v. United States. As the courts (and the world) would come to 
realize, this was “no ordinary lawsuit” (Juliana v. United States, 2016, 3).  
Also known as Youth v. Gov, the case uses its novel legal arguments to tell a 
story that resonates with its audience. Instead of holding a specific polluter accountable 
or objecting to weak enforcement by the EPA, Juliana aims higher and names the 
federal government as defendant. The legal arguments for climate protection are also 
new. Juliana makes 5th Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection arguments to 
accuse the government of intentionally violating the youth plaintiffs’ rights to life, 
liberty, and property—as well as their newly defined right to a stable climate. Juliana 
elevates climate to the ranks of historic civil rights., invoking cases like Brown v. Board 
of Education (1954), all while shifting the climate conversation away from atmosphere 
and data and towards people and justice. The justice issue in question is 
intergenerational, which Juliana incorporates by including a representative for “future 




breached a duty by invoking the Public Trust Doctrine (PTD). The PTD dates back 
beyond United States common law to the Roman Empire and requires stewardship of 
the natural resources upon which society depends for its continued existence. The 
principle establishes shared natural resources such as air, water, and wildlife as assets 
that must be protected by the trustee: in this case, the United States government.  
Juliana’s framing of the climate crisis through fundamental rights language and 
the obligation of the PTD combines to create a compelling narrative, one that has 
persisted in court despite repeated government opposition. But the reception from those 
courts has been mixed. Most lawsuits are either dismissed or sent to trial, but Juliana 
has bounced between courts through three different presidential administrations (see 
Table 1 for timeline). So, why do the youth plaintiffs rest their hopes on a novel claim 
with slim chances of persuading typically restrained judges to grant them favorable 
rulings? One potential answer is that victory in court is not the only way Juliana 
achieves its goals. Even beyond dissenting opinions that support the plaintiffs, which 
OCT senior litigator Andrea Rodgers considers “part of the success column,” Juliana 
may benefit from its power to grab attention and shape the global climate change 
narrative (Drugman, 2020). 
Juliana is not alone in reframing climate in the court of public opinion. Young 
people across the world face the same challenge as the Juliana plaintiffs: they will be 
most impacted by climate change in their lifetimes, yet they have no voice in the 
political process to demand change. Instead of heading to court, many of these young 




activists like Swedish teenager Greta Thunberg who has become the movement’s 
reluctant figurehead, it is remarkably similar to that of Juliana in its priorities.  
Many legal scholars have written about the legal basis of Juliana and countless 
journalists cover the growing wave of youth-led climate activism. But less research 
links the two. When law and activism are primarily evaluated separately, this creates a 
gap that misses how a lawsuit can function as activism. The goal of this thesis is to 
position Juliana within the larger fields of law and activism in a way that could expand 
the measure for success in the case. By viewing Juliana within the larger legal and 
activist contexts, we will see how the lawsuit represents just one dimension of the 
current climate activist movement which prioritizes human rights rather than the 




Juliana v. United States filed in the Eugene District Court. 
November, 
2015 
Federal government files motion to dismiss, arguing that the plaintiffs 




District Judge Aiken denies motion to dismiss and publishes opinion in 
favor of the plaintiffs. Aiken grants standing and largely accepts the 
public trust and constitutional claims.    
March, 
2017 
Defendants file a motion asking for interlocutory appeal, meaning that 
the case would be reviewed by the Appellate Court before discovery or 
trial could take place.  
June, 2017 District court denies interlocutory appeal, the following day the 




Oral arguments before the Ninth Circuit.  
March, 
2018 
Ninth Circuit declines to intervene, allowing the case to proceed.  
July, 2018 Supreme Court denies government’s request to stay the case.   
October, 
2018 
District Court Judge Aiken hears oral arguments on another motion from 
the defendants. In October, she dismisses President Trump from the 




their Equal Protection claim can proceed based on the alleged 
fundamental rights violation). 
October, 
2018 
Government files a second writ of mandamus and application for a stay 
with the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court denies the application, 
though the trial start date is delayed. 
November, 
2018 
Government files a third petition for a writ of mandamus and motion for 
a stay. The case is certified for interlocutory appeal. 
June, 2019 Oral arguments before the Ninth Circuit, lead attorney for the plaintiffs 
Julia Olson argues that the case should proceed. Assistant Attorney 
General Jeffrey Clark argues that the plaintiffs lack standing, that the 
plaintiffs have turned to the wrong branch, and that the plaintiffs should 
have relied on the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), which 
concerns agency action.  
January, 
2020 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals issues an opinion dismissing the case 
based on the determination that they were unable to fulfill the plaintiffs’ 
requested redress of a Climate Recovery Plan.  
March, 
2020 
Plaintiffs file a petition for the case to be heard by a new panel with 11 
Ninth Circuit judges.  
February, 
2021 
The Ninth Circuit declines to rehear the case. 
March, 
2021 
Plaintiffs file a motion to amend their initial complaint to remove the 
Climate Recovery aspect of the remedy request. The requested remedy 
would instead include only the declaration that the plaintiffs’ rights were 
violated.  
May, 2021 Judge Aiken schedules oral arguments and orders both sides to convene 
for settlement talks. 
 
Table 1: Timeline of events in Juliana v. United States, including important petitions, 
decisions, and turnings points in the case, but not every single filing by either side.  
Sources: Our Children’s Trust and Climate Case Charts 
Methods 
The research for this thesis was categorized into two broad areas: climate litigation and 
youth-led activism on climate. I explored these topics through legal cases, news 
coverage, primary sources like speeches and Congressional testimony, and literature 
bridging the gap between the two areas. My research strategy fell into the broad 
category of “law and.” This means that the first part of the research was purely a legal 
analysis (of older environmental law, Juliana, and post-2015 climate cases). The “and” 
refers to the research extending beyond the cases and law review articles to scholarship 
that links youth-led climate litigation and activism.  
I selected the pre-Juliana cases based on whether they established a precedent 




purpose of reading these cases was to construct a picture of the legal landscape from 
which Juliana emerged and to determine if there was a contrast between these older 
cases and OCT’s Atmospheric Trust Litigation campaign. To investigate Juliana itself, 
I relied on press releases, written and media coverage, and the timeline of major court 
orders from the OCT website. My goal in reading about Juliana beyond the court 
documents was to see how OCT framed and communicated their strategy to a non-legal 
audience. Finally, within the legal category, I searched for cases that either directly 
cited Juliana or attempted the ATL strategy by invoking the PTD or constitutional 
violations regarding climate protection. After finding these cases on Westlaw or 
Climate Case Charts, I filled out a questionnaire to determine how each case’s approach 
to climate protection compared to Juliana’s, how the case fared in court, and what the 
case as a whole might mean for the trajectory of climate litigation.  
The goal of this thesis was not to analyze the entire field of climate change 
activism, so the first step of my activism research had to be narrowing down which 
figures, organizations, or campaigns were relevant to me. The selection criteria I 
employed were qualitative, based either on prominence in the movement or closeness to 
Juliana. I looked to speeches, news and media coverage, and the writings of the 
selected activists in order to determine what the key themes of their message were, what 




Section I: Legal Foundations of Climate Rights 
Research on climate litigation spans several fields, from narrow analyses of 
legal procedure (Cooney 2007) to interdisciplinary interactions between law and 
legislation, media, or public opinion (Gloppen and St. Clair 2013). One study by law 
professors Jacqueline Peel and Hari M. Osofsky dedicated to identifying trends in the 
field suggests that the diversity of literature is “a reflection of the breadth of climate 
change itself” (Peel and Osofsky 2020). The most important trend for this thesis is the 
“human rights turn” emerging in climate litigation (Setzer and Vanhala 2019, Peel and 
Osofsky 2020). To understand this trend, we will consider the legal foundations that 
comprise climate change litigation starting with the theory of using the constitution to 
protect future generations, then moving to the application via Atmospheric Trust 
Litigation (ATL). Finally, this section will address the question of whether climate 
belongs in the courts at all.  
Constitutional Protections for Future Generations 
As is true of several constitutional protections in place today, the right to a 
stable climate (or even to breathe air free from harmful pollution) is not in the language 
of the Constitution. But that does not mean that this right does not exist. Alternatively, 
Juliana’s argument may fall into the category of implicit rights that can be identified 
and safeguarded by the courts. The idea of conserving the environment with either 
existing constitutional mechanisms or with new additions is now new. In this section, 
legal scholars will provide the crucial background of intergenerational justice, which is 
key to a case like Juliana that aims to level the field between adults in power, youth 




The evolution of the right to privacy exemplifies how a fundamental right can be 
recognized by the courts. While an explicit right to privacy was not enumerated in the 
text of the Constitution, the Supreme Court reasoned in the case Griswold v. 
Connecticut (1965) that the concept was implied in the other protections cemented in 
the document. In Griswold, the Supreme Court looked back to the time of the founders 
and inferred that they clearly meant for a zone of privacy free from government 
intervention to exist. In a modern example, the Supreme Court determined in Obergefell 
v. Hodges (2015) that gay marriage was “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” 
Oregon District Court Judge Ann Aiken later quoted Obergefell when ruling on Juliana 
to proclaim that “the identification and protection of fundamental rights…required 
courts to exercise reasoned judgment in identifying interests of the person so 
fundamental that the State must accord them respect” (Obergefell v. Hodges, 2015). 
There is even an entire amendment dedicated to ensuring that “the enumeration” of 
certain rights within the Constitution “shall not be construed to deny or disparage others 
retained by the people” (U.S. Const. amend. IX). Yet the 9th Amendment is rarely 
treated as a viable basis for a lawsuit. These examples lead to the questions: what 
constitutes a fundamental right? How can a stable climate, foundational to humanity’s 
continued existence, not be implicit in ordered liberty? Considering the judicial history 
of identifying previously unrecognized constitutional protections when novel issues 
arise, the legal scholars in this section will demonstrate how it may not be so radical to 
consider the possibility that the right to a stable climate existed all along.  
Scholars who propose constitutional safeguards for young people and future 




preamble to the Constitution, the values of the Founders, or broader philosophies about 
what we owe to each other. One of the most influential texts defining intergenerational 
justice and public trusts is In Fairness to Future Generations, a 1988 book by 
Georgetown Law Professor Edith Brown Weiss. In a prior law review article, “The 
Planetary Trust: Conservation and Intergenerational Equity,” Weiss explains that “the 
human species holds the natural and cultural resources of the planet in a trust for all 
generations” (Weiss, 1984, 498). Thinking about the planet in terms of fiduciary 
responsibility means that future generations are the beneficiaries, while present 
generations serve as both beneficiary and trustee. This dual role is important because 
Weiss is not suggesting that present generations should not extract resources for their 
own benefit during their lifetimes. Instead, she merely argues that their usage should not 
supersede the freedom of future generations to do the same. Weiss’ prescribed 
obligation for the trustee involves preserving “the diversity of the resource base and to 
pass the planet to future generations in no worse condition that it receives it” (Weiss, 
1984, 500). While this may sound like a difficult task, concern for future generations 
can be seen throughout politics, religion, and culture for eons. There is, in fact, “nearly 
universal recognition and acceptance among peoples” of this obligation (Weiss, 1984, 
500). Weiss treats the creation of institutions, artwork, and technology that will outlive 
the current generation as evidence that “human beings appear to have a basic 
physiological need to transcend the self by relating to the future” (Weiss 1984, 500). 
Why else would we plant trees that take a century to grow?  
But a shared concern, or even a moral obligation, cannot be made into a 




enforceability on the basis that the government has known about the impending 
changing climate for decades and ignored it. In its Amended Complaint, Juliana 
exposes 50 years of legislative and executive awareness of the impending climate crisis 
followed by lukewarm policy recommendations and inaction (Juliana v. United States, 
2015). Greta Thunberg echoed this sentiment when she used her Earth Day speech 
before Congress to accuse the lawmakers in her audience of being “so naive” that they 
“believe things will be solved through countries and companies making vague, distant, 
insufficient targets” (Thunberg 2021). Weiss deals with the lack of legal backing to 
intergenerational justice by drawing upon a body of law known as charitable trust law. 
She explains how a charitable trust could meet the needs of a long-term crisis because 
its beneficiaries do not need to be individually named, the duration is unlimited, and—
since “its existence is implicit in the nature of the relationship between generations”—
its creation is informal (Weiss, 1984, 504). A trust could be further beneficial because it 
does not differentiate between the very next generation and one a thousand years away 
in terms of care, nor does it support the idea that resources can be used up presently so 
long as wealth and knowledge are passed down in their place (Weiss, 1984, 508).  
By putting forth the idea of a trust all the way back in 1984, Weiss helped to 
build the foundation for OCT’s central legal argument that the federal government has 
an affirmative public trust obligation to preserve a life-sustaining climate system. Some 
aspects of the two trust proposals are the same—both would grant standing to a 
representative of future generations and have the primary goal of sustaining life-
supporting systems. Despite the benefits and the ever-increasing need, Weiss recognizes 




problem that OCT plaintiffs turn to the courts to remedy—that “[o]ur state and 
international institutions are designed to handle relatively short-term problems which 
last no more than a few years” due to “[p]olitical incentives [that] encourage those in 
positions of power to focus primarily on issues that will bring tangible results in a short 
time” (Weiss, 1984, 563). The two differ in scale, Weiss’ trust is global while OCT’s is 
necessarily based in the United States legal system, and in their specific requests, 
Weiss’s implementation strategy includes a literal trust fund for future generations, 
while OCT asks for a declaration of rights and for a plan to end federal involvement in 
the fossil fuel industry. 
Weiss’ intergenerational perspective made her influential to subsequent 
scholarship. In 1994, retired president of one of the largest environmental organizations, 
Defenders of Wildlife, Rodger Schlickeisen argued for a constitutional amendment to 
protect biodiversity for future generations. He agrees that society has a moral 
responsibility to future generations, even citing Weiss, though his proposed solution is 
quite different. He also explains why the topic of intergenerational fairness may have 
seemed newfangled or even unnecessary in 1994: because the science behind 
biodiversity loss was still emerging. “Until scientists proved otherwise, there was no 
reason to pursue the issue of responsibility of present generations to their descendants” 
(Schlickeisen, 1994, 190). 
Schlickeisen differs from Weiss, however, in a few crucial ways. First, instead 
of focusing on preserving resources for people to benefit from, Schlickeisen argues that 
biodiversity alone has enough inhIerent value to deserve constitutional protection. This 




opposed to the more anthropocentric focus of the environmental justice (EJ) movement. 
In a list of threats to the planet, Schlickeisen lists “global warming, ozone depletion, 
[and] industrial chemicals,” yet singles out biodiversity loss as “uniquely menacing 
because of its accelerating speed and irreversibility” (Schlickeisen, 1994, 184). This 
does not mean that EJ proponents do not care about conservation for its own sake, it is 
just a question of prioritization. The evolution of the environmental movement from 
preserving nature for its own sake to advocating for climate justice in an intersectional 
way has been observed even by the Juliana plaintiffs over their much more recent 
journeys into activism (Center for Environmental Futures, 2020). 
Schlickeisen also chronicles a shift in the environmental movement, writing that 
the biggest challenges in the past “such as contaminated air and water, were easily seen 
by the naked eye, and it was clear to the public that the problems were intensifying,” 
while present threats “involve more subtle, long-term ecological degradation” 
(Schlickeisen, 1994, 183-184). An individual factory leaking chemicals into drinking 
water, for example, presents a visible injury, attributable blame, and there is a clear 
solution to remedy the problem. With challenges like this, people were able to alert their 
elected officials, which led directly to a series of new environmental statutes in the 
1970s. Schlickeisen calls the resulting Clean Air Act (CAA) and Clean Water Act 
(CWA) the “crown jewels of our environmental protection,” but acknowledges that they 
are still not equipped to fight his battle against biodiversity loss. These statutes can even 
turn into obstacles by giving “the public the impression that all critical environmental 
problems are being solved” though “the contrary is true” (Schlickeisen, 1994, 184). 




different presidents with three different approaches to climate change yet with the same 
confrontational approach to Juliana in court. On the one hand, President Biden’s 
climate platform receives praise in the media. Economics professor and Director of the 
Center for Sustainable Development at Columbia University Jeffrey Sachs penned an 
op-ed titled “Biden’s remarkable success on climate” (Sachs, 2021). However, on the 
other hand, OCT’s lead counsel Julia Olson lamented the fact that the Biden 
administration ignored the plaintiffs’ repeated requests to discuss a settlement 
agreement that could end the adversarial relationship between Juliana and the 
government defendants (Olson and Cooper, 2021). 
Another of Schlickeisen’s 1994 observations doubtless rings true for the Juliana 
plaintiffs today: “American action specifically to protect biodiversity, a movement the 
major stakeholders in which cannot vote and mostly are not yet alive, is woefully 
inadequate” (Schlickeisen, 1994, 197). And to remedy this proposal, Schlickeisen 
makes a more radical proposal than Weiss. He argues that the omission of “something 
as basic as society’s need to assure the sustainability of our living natural resources” 
was an oversight that cannot be remedied by any means of the existing legal system 
(Schlickeisen, 1994, 201). To overcome “the formidable reality of the Constitution’s 
silence of stewardship of natural resources,” Schlickeisen considers statutory and 
common law approaches, including public nuisance and the public trust doctrine (PTD), 
and deems them all to be inadequate. Despite the fact that public nuisance “by 
definition involves harm to an interest common to the general public, “it also “has never 
been extended to a subject as complex as conserving biodiversity for human benefit” 




legal track record, he calls it only “arguably” available (Schlickeisen, 1994, 203). 
Schlickeisen’s reticence to consider the PTD, in combination with his bold proposal to 
amend the Constitution itself, seems to be representative of the literature prior to 
University of Oregon Law professor Mary Wood’s development of Atmospheric Trust 
Litigation (ATL) and OCT’s application of the theory. 
Even before Weiss and Schlickeisen, legal scholars had begun to recognize the 
growing threat of discrimination against future generations. In 1978, former president of 
Lewis and Clark Law School Jim Gardner suggested that “intergenerational fairness” 
could be achieved through the existing language and spirit of the Constitution. Like 
Weiss, Gardner argues that intergenerational fairness is not a new idea. In fact, the spirit 
of the theory has been expressed in political speeches, mentioned in at least one 
Supreme Court ruling, and “a close examination of the debates of the Federal 
Convention of 1787 reveals that the draftsmen of the Constitution invariably took the 
view that their generation had an obligation to protect the well-being of future 
generations” (Gardner, 1978, 35). While a strict reading of the Constitution would not 
permit forays into the philosophies, notes, or other writings of the Framers, Gardner’s 
theory does not rely solely on centuries old debates. Instead, he argues that a key line, 
“and our Posterity,” of the Preamble to the Constitution demonstrates an ideal that is 
made concrete within the following articles and amendments. If the founders’ belief 
“that they were obliged to act in the best interests of posterity” serves as an “intellectual 
backdrop” for the development of the nation’s enduring laws and customs, then the only 
task remaining for Gardner was to determine whether this “can provide the basis for 




Gardner is not the only one to look back to 1787 for clues as to how to protect 
future generations. In a recent interview, Julia Olson references a speech from James 
Madison in which he asserts, all the way back in 1818, that “the atmosphere is the 
breath of life. Deprived of it, they all equally perish” (Olson and Cooper, 2021, 
Madison, 1818). This is just one example of the founders’ affinity for the environment. 
Retired University of Oregon professor John Davidson provides another example by 
referencing the “abundant discussions of intergenerational justice that the framers (and 
their intellectual predecessors) saw fit to preserve in writing” (Davidson, 2003, 195). In 
addition to strengthening the backbone of Juliana’s intergenerational argument, 
Davidson supports the case by submitting an amicus brief in 2016. He explains the 
“reserved powers” doctrine, which inhibits the current leaders at any given time from 
infringing upon the “equal sovereignty of later legislatures” (Davidson, 2016, 2). 
Through this lens, the District Court should fulfill its duty of checking the legislative 
branches lest they grievously limit the power of future elected officials.    
Unlike Schlickeisen’s or Weiss’s later proposals, the extent of Gardner’s 
solution to remedy discrimination lies in judicial review based on the current language 
of the Constitution. He recognizes the difficulty of this task, however, since the 
language in question “appears no longer to be capable of serving its intended purpose 
adequately because of an unanticipated change in extrinsic circumstances” (Gardner, 
1978, 48). One of these barriers revolves around practical applications of 
intergenerational fairness. It takes only a few mentions of the term “unborn” before it 
becomes apparent how this doctrine could add to the proverbial toolbox of pro-life, anti-




nevertheless concludes it to be “irrelevant to the question of the existence…of a 
constitutional principle of intergenerational fairness” (Gardner, 1978, 49). He argues 
that, despite the similar terminology, the bodily autonomy and intergenerational justice 
debates are very different. Later scholarship affirms this conclusion, citing the 
distinction between generalized rights like a stable climate and the individual right to 
bodily autonomy (Davidson, 2003, 189). Alternatively, the potentially messy issue of 
granting standing for future generations could be avoided by using prospective parents 
as stand-ins (Nguyen, 2017, 198). While the Constitution may lend implicit (or explicit, 
depending on who you ask) support to the concept of intergenerational justice, no 
scholars in this review assume that the task of implementing solutions to the climate 
crisis using this framework would be simple. The abortion aspect is just one question 
that those seeking to apply constitutional protections for future generations may have to 
reckon with.  
Not all legal scholars agree that protections for future generations should be (or 
already are) enshrined in the judicial system. While Cincinnati Law professor Bradford 
C. Mank agrees with Weiss, Schlickeisen, Gardner, Davidson, and Nguyen that “there 
are important moral reasons to protect the future” and that “current environmental laws 
fail” to do so, he argues that the courts are not properly equipped to handle a crisis of 
this scale (Mank, 1996, 446-450). None of the three branches, according to Mank, are 
up to the task. Congress and the executive are too susceptible to “short-term political 
pressures,” while the courts, which purportedly operate as an independent, even 
countermajoritarian, body are less effective in answering questions “at the frontiers of 




again disagreed with judicial action on climate change in response to Judge Aiken’s 
Juliana decision. In a law review article titled “Can Judges Use Due Process in 
Obergefell to Impose Judicial Regulation of Greenhouse Gases and Climate Change?: 
The Crucial Case of Juliana v. United States,” Mank answers no, arguing that both 
Juliana’s district court ruling and Obergefell itself were wrongly decided. There are two 
major ways to address discrimination under the Constitution: equal protection or due 
process. Juliana plaintiffs invoke both arguments, but Aiken relied only on due process 
and used Obergefell as precedent. Obergefell held that gay marriage was a fundamental 
right, denial of which resulted in violation of due process. But Mank argues that 
“fundamental due process rights must be rooted in the nation’s history and traditions,” 
thus Obergefell (and Juliana in relying on it) overstepped the bounds of judicial power 
to “invent new due process rights and usurp the role of the legislature” (Mank 2020, 
278). Whether one agrees with Mank or with the pro-intergenerational justice expects, 
Juliana has clearly tapped into a large and contentious body of scholarship by 
constitutionalizing climate. To understand how Juliana fits into this field, we will next 
ask what constitutionalizing climate does for the case.   
Juliana’s Right to a Stable Climate 
The constitutional aspect of Juliana could yield both narrative and procedural 
benefits. Not only does the claim that the government violated Posterity’s fundamental 
rights set Juliana apart from the field of not-too-successful environmental lawsuits and 
elevate it to the narrative ranks of cases like Brown v. Board of Education, but the level 
of scrutiny to be applied by the judges also shifts. There are three different lenses 




basis, intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny. As the level of scrutiny increases, 
judges give decreased deference to the legislature. The lowest level, rational basis, 
merely asks whether the policy in question is reasonably related to a legitimate state 
interest. At the highest level, strict scrutiny, the actions must be found to be the least 
restrictive means of achieving a compelling state interest. Rational basis rarely leads a 
policy to be overturned, while few government actions can survive a strict scrutiny 
evaluation.  
There are two avenues through which the scrutiny level can be raised, either 
through a due process or an equal protection claim. A 5th Amendment due process claim 
involves the violation of a fundamental right, which could either be a right enumerated 
in the Bill of Rights or a right that the courts otherwise determine to be fundamental. 
When legislation discriminates against an entire category of people based on 
characteristics that raise judicial suspicion, then the 5th Amendment Equal Protection 
Clause is implicated. A judge typically identifies a suspect class, like race or religion, 
by asking whether the members of that class constitute an insular minority with 
immutable traits. Juliana argues that its plaintiffs “are a separate suspect class in need 
of extraordinary protection from the political process” because of the defendants’ “long 
history of deliberately discriminating against children and future generations in exerting 
their sovereign authority over our nation’s air space and federal fossil fuel resources for 
the economic benefit of the present generation of adults” (Juliana v. United States, 
2015, 89). This is aggravated by the fact that young people have no voting rights or 
political power, which they are largely unable to change. Juliana argues that the due 




climate system is inherent to our fundamental rights of life, liberty, and property 
becomes more clear and compelling because of the grave and continuing harm to 
children that results from discriminatory laws (Juliana v. United States, 2015, 89). 
Because the two alleged violations are intertwined, when considered on its merits 
Juliana could receive a higher level of scrutiny than a statutory climate case. Thus far, 
the only judge to consider Juliana on its merits was District Judge Aiken. While she did 
not hold that the children were a suspect class, she still wrote that the case “must be 
evaluated through the lens of strict scrutiny” which would only “be aided by further 
development of the factual record” (Juliana v. United States, 2016). Since Juliana is 
still ongoing, it is too early to determine what level of scrutiny it will ultimately receive. 
But by invoking both due process and equal protection, the plaintiffs have two bites at 
the apple to constitutionalize climate.  
The Public Trust Doctrine and Atmospheric Trust Litigation 
In order to understand how Juliana incorporates intergenerational justice 
theories, we can look to the ambivalent body of scholarship on the doctrine and to how 
OCT’s ATL campaign puts the PTD into practice. While the PTD had been applied 
primarily to navigable waters and the sea floor prior to OCT’s campaign, there is a 
growing body of literature by a select group of authors who write in support of or in 
opposition to the principle. Sometimes they even respond to each other directly to 
criticize the others’ approach.1  
                                                        
1 See Professor Lazarus’s “Judicial Missteps, Legislative Dysfunction, and the Public Trust Doctrine: Can 
Two Wrongs Make it Right” in 2015 followed the next year by Professor Blumm’s “Two Wrongs: 




The writings most fundamental to Juliana are by University of Oregon Law 
professor Mary Wood, who originated the concept of atmospheric trust litigation. She 
debuted the concept in a 2007 keynote address with key points including “The Dawn of 
Planetary Patriotism” and “A Race Against Time: Arresting Emissions Growth by 
2010” (Wood, 2007). While emissions may not have been arrested by 2010, Wood’s 
legal frameworks have since been implemented by Our Children’s Trust in state, 
national, and international lawsuits. One of her articles, “No Ordinary Lawsuit: Climate 
Change, Due Process, and the Public Trust Doctrine” with Lewis and Clark Law 
professor Michael C. Blumm provides an in-depth analysis of the first, and only thus 
far, ruling to hear the Juliana case on its merits and rule in favor of the plaintiffs. Wood 
and Blumm argue vehemently for the application of the PTD and chronicle the 
evolution of OCT’s national and international ATL campaign. The two authors 
emphasize the desperate situation—both climatically and legally—that led to OCT’s 
campaign. The case was not filed on a whim to empower “a single district court in 
Oregon,” (United States Court of Appeals, 2019) as the government asserts. It was filed 
because “at a time when the political system seems prepared to shun responsible climate 
action, the lawsuit may be the only legal mechanism that can ‘trump’ the incumbent 
administration” (Blumm and Wood, 2017, 8). 
Adding to the literature supporting OCT’s campaign is an article by Monmouth 
University political science and sociology professor Randall Abate that highlights the 
shift in moral and legal priorities that the constitutionalization of climate signals. 
Similar to the suggestions of the intergenerational fairness scholars, Abate recognizes 




“the ways in which human health had become imperiled from the rise in pollution in the 
industrial age” that recent environmental law has undergone (Abate, 2019, 1). While 
“rights-based thinking” used to be “confined to the social justice domain,” separate 
from environmental law, the two are no longer so far apart (Abate, 2019, 2). Abate calls 
the recent combination “environmental justice litigation,” which seeks “to inject a civil 
rights-based theory throughout the nation by seeking remedies for how contamination 
burdens were disproportionately burdening minority and low-income communities” 
(Abate, 2019, 2). While Abate explains how ATL could be considered modern 
reincarnation of this early 2000s attempt to constitutionalize climate, there are key 
differences in the strategies. Both the constitutional backing and the plaintiffs differ. 
The earlier environmental justice litigation relied only on equal protection, while that is 
only a minor part of Juliana’s claim (and so-far overlooked by the courts’ analyses), 
and the earlier cases concerned themselves only with present discrimination in safe 
environmental conditions, but ATL has a future-focused strategy where the plaintiffs 
are children and future generations (Abate, 2019, 2). Further, ATL is a coordinated 
campaign conceived and carried out by one non-profit organization, while Abate’s 
examples cover a range of similar, but disconnected, cases (Abate, 2019, 3).  
There is also an area of literature dedicated to questioning the existence and 
criticizing the modern applications of the Public Trust Doctrine.2 In an acerbic 
assessment of the PTD, former professor and dean of the Lewis and Clark Law School 
James L. Huffman writes that there are two histories of the PTD: “One founded in 
                                                        
2 See Lazarus, Richard. "Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources: 
Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine” (1986) or Huffman, J. "Speaking of Inconvenient Truths - A 




Anglo-American custom and case law. Another founded in the imaginations of now two 
generations of advocates search of a fail-safe guardian of the environment” (Huffman, 
2019, 1). Huffman’s central critique of the doctrine and the supporting literature like 
Blumm and Wood’s is one of inadequate the justification. The urgency of climate 
change is insufficient, for Huffman, to justify “rewrit[ing] history in the name of 
establishing new public rights” beyond the scope of the “rule of law system with 
constitutional separation of powers” (Huffman, 2019, 20). OCT’s coordinated ATL 
campaign provides evidence for Huffman of the dire nature of the problem. As more 
and more of these lawsuits proceed, he fears they will eventually find “judges willing to 
make new law in the name of urgency of necessity” (Huffman, 2019, 20). Support or 
derision of the application of the PTD appears to come down to personal philosophies 
regarding the extra-textual beliefs of the founders or the appropriateness of judicial 
response to climate change. With the notable exception of Huffman, post-2015 
literature typically engages with Juliana and OCT’s national campaign of Atmospheric 
Trust Litigation (ATL) and largely comes out in support. 
Does Climate Belong in the Courts? 
An essential question underpinning Juliana is not just whether the courts can but 
also whether they should take on the matter. Advocates of judicial restraint say no 
(Gifford, 2011, 202). Instead, the courts should value the “wisdom in the traditional 
limits courts have placed on themselves” and dismiss these cases via standing or the 
political questions doctrine (Gifford, 2011, 207). But others answer affirmatively and 
even argue that the courts abdicate their constitutional responsibility by dismissing 




and Kysar, 2017, and Kuh, 2019). Law professors Douglas Kysar and Benjamin Ewing 
developed a new framework to evaluate when and why the courts should answer 
controversial questions, which they call “prods and pleas” (Ewing and Kysar, 2011, 
359). They argue that the traditional understanding of the relationship between the three 
branches as checks-and-balances should be expanded to include the more subtle ways in 
which the branches “can push each other to entertain collective political action when 
necessary” (Ewing and Kysar, 2011, 350). If checks and balances protect against 
overreach, then Ewing and Kysar’s prods and pleads guard against underreach (Ewing 
and Kysar 2011, 364). Instead of demanding, they explain that each branch can invite 
action by another. For example, “by struggling to apply common law principles to the 
harms of an ever more complex and interconnected world…courts deliver dignified, 
public pronouncements that legislative and administrative inertia have left our basic 
ideals unprotected” (Ewing and Kysar, 2011, 375).  
The responsibility to deal with complicated issues like climate change does not 
have to fall on the shoulders of the court alone. Instead, Ewing and Kysar argue that the 
novel challenges posed by the scale and relative lack of visibility of climate change 
would be best confronted from multiple angles, rather than any one branch working 
alone (Ewing and Kysar, 2011, 410). Even if climate legislation ends up advancing 
faster and farther than lawsuits like Juliana can work their way through the courts, it 
would still “be unwise to disable an institution such as the tort system from engaging in 
the substance of the problem” (Ewing and Kysar, 2011, 410). Similarly, OCT suggests 




“scorched earth tactics” by working with the plaintiffs to either let the case proceed to 
trial or engage in settlement talks (Our Children’s Trust, 2021).  
These two professors are not the only ones who argue that the relationships 
between branches are often misunderstood. Outside of the context of climate, legal 
scholar Mark Graber proposes that elected officials routinely invite the courts to deal 
with messy political issues that they would rather not touch. Graber argues that “rather 
than treat judicial review as a practice that either sustains or rejects the measures 
favored by lawmaking majorities,” the public should “pay closer attention to the 
constitutional dialogues that take place between American governing institutions on the 
crosscutting issues that internally divide the existing lawmaking majority” (Graber, 
1993, 36). Graber cites cases like Brown v. Board and Roe v. Wade as rare but 
important examples of when “prominent elected officials consciously invite the 
judiciary to resolve those political controversies that they cannot or would rather not 
address” (Graber, 1993, 36). These articles were both published before Juliana, but 
Kysar later considered the case with another Yale Law professor R. Henry Weaver. The 
two argue that common law and constitutional law approaches are “fraught with 
analytical and practical difficulties” yet remain “essential” (Weaver and Kysar, 2017, 
295). In fact, when judges “use weak preliminary and procedural maneuvers” to dodge 
controversial issues (like the Ninth Circuit dismissing Juliana on redressability) they 
“reinforce a sense of the law’s disappearance” (Weaver and Kysar, 2017, 295).  
Judicial response to climate change seems to be gaining acceptance within the field of 
legal scholarship. Another author adding to the commentary on whether climate belongs 




the 2019 law review article “The Legitimacy of Judicial Climate Engagement.” Kuh 
traces the history of “judicial climate avoidance” from the displacement of federal 
public nuisance as a viable legal strategy to the “dogged effort to avoid a trial” by the 
government defendants in Juliana (Kuh, 2019, 742). Similar to Ewing and Kysar, she 
counters the government’s argument that the issues raised by Juliana should be left to 
lawmakers alone by arguing that “the need for judicial engagement on core climate 
questions does not disappear even if Congress enacts a robust federal decarbonation 
statute” (Kuh, 2019, 764). And, ending on an optimistic note, she suggests that Juliana 
“may signal an increased judicial willingness to adjudicate climate suits” (Kuh, 2019, 
742).  
Scholars who argue that the courts can (and must) step up to resolve 
controversial matters like climate change offer us new tools with which to think about 
the purpose a lawsuit, especially one like Juliana with novel claims or arguable merit. 
The works of Ewing, Kysar, Graber, Weaver, and Kuh add complementary 
contributions to the viewpoint that addressing a hot-button issue does not automatically 
constitute judicial overreach.  
Pre-Juliana Legal Landscape 
Statutory and Nuisance Claims 
Before asking whether Juliana has provided any viable new legal pathways for 
subsequent youth-led climate cases, we must first find out where Juliana came from. 
The state of climate litigation in the early 2010s can tell us what led OCT to—as Mary 




climate crisis continues to intensify and capture the attention of the world, yet it has 
largely failed to attract meaningful action from the two elected branches of government. 
In response, more and more activists and public interest groups have turned to the third 
branch. The Climate Case Chart website by the Sabin Center for Climate Change Law 
at Columbia Law School has compiled data on legal and administrative proceedings 
since 1986 (Sabin Center for Climate Change Law, 2021). The database now contains 
1250 cases within the United States alone. Despite this prodigious growth (see Figure 
1), the decades-old debate among scholars as to whether the courts are able to confront 
climate change risks, liabilities, and adaptations continues to this day and only 
intensified with the filing of Juliana v. United States in 2015. Whether or not OCT’s 
state, federal, or international cases will end with favorable rulings for the plaintiffs, 
they already represent a major switch in the existing body of climate change lawsuits 
which had previously applied ordinary statutory and tort-based approaches to the 
extraordinary circumstances. In 2012, law professors David Markell and J.B. Ruhl 
analyzed 201 examples of climate change litigation in order to provide a thorough data 
set for scholarship to rely on to characterize and to project the future of the field 





Figure 1: Climate-related lawsuits and scholarly articles published from 1986-2020.  
Sources: Case data from the Climate Case Charts database on U.S. litigation and 
publication data 2000-2018 from Setzer and Vanhala (2019) and 2019 from Peel and 
Osofky (2020).  
Climate litigation is a broad field, yet up until OCT’s ATL campaign, the majority of 
cases had small scopes and unremarkable legal arguments. Markell and Ruhl 
categorized the 201 cases in their study as either “pro” or “anti” interests seeking to 
either increase or decrease regulations or liability. This system allowed them to tell the 
“story of climate in the courts” and find the majority of cases to be “grinding away at 
fairly narrow factual and legal issues” (Markell and Ruhl 2012, 86). OCT’s combined 
law and constitutional framework falls under their “pro” category, more specifically 
under the “rights and liabilities” heading, which as of 2012 Markell and Ruhl reported 


































pre-Juliana lawsuits were not novel. Ninety percent relied on statutes like the Clean Air 
Act (CAA), National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), and the Endangered Species 
Act (ESA). This narrow focus “limits the latitude for courts to chart novel new 
interpretations” as “the statutes involved have been on the books for decades and have 
substantial preexisting jurisprudence, little room is available for the courts to depart 
from precedent and forge new law…even if they were so inclined” (Markell and Ruhl 
2012, 69, 25). The authors agree that “climate change demands a new policy model for 
legislatures” and lament the “judicial baggage” that continues to accumulate limiting 
the discretion of judges who may wish to chart a new course (Markell and Ruhl 2012, 
62). 
Despite the uninspiring conclusion drawn by Markell and Ruhl, some so-called 
“ordinary” statutory claims still prevailed in court and set the stage for Juliana to 
emerge. One landmark case in which the environmental interests received a favorable 
ruling is Massachusetts v. EPA (2007). Yet Markell and Ruhl call Mass “a resounding 
judicial rejection of climate exceptionalism in terms of how existing statutes are to be 
applied” (Markell and Ruhl, 2012, 67). In Mass, several states petitioned the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to regulate emissions of greenhouse gases 
(GHGs) under the existing CAA framework. The EPA declined and the case eventually 
advanced to the Supreme Court, which ruled in favor of the states. The majority opinion 
declared that the CAA’s broad definition of an “air pollutant” that could be regulated 
necessarily included GHGs, although the agency retained discretion at to the actual 
regulation. While Markell and Ruhl describe the case as a “rather vanilla statutory 




“momentous progress” (Dowling, 2007). One specific step forward for climate cases 
provided by Mass was later cited by the Ninth Circuit in its 2020 Juliana ruling. The 
Supreme Court has generally held that, to meet standing requirements, injury in a case 
must be particular as opposed to general. But in Mass, the Supreme Court clarified that 
“it does not matter how many persons have been injured” to meet the particularized 
injury requirement, so long as the plaintiffs themselves were impacted. Even though 
Markell and Ruhl identified significant judicial baggage barring the way for many 
climate claims, cases like Mass show judicial recognition of climate change and early 
support for action that could potentially lead to tighter regulations of GHGs.  
Federal Public Nuisance Displacement 
Juliana could have invoked the more familiar common law approach of public 
nuisance—which has a track record of being applied to harmful emissions that the PTD 
lacks—were it not for the ultimate consequence of Mass: displacement of federal 
common law in favor of CAA claims. Despite the apparent success of the 
environmental interests in Mass, the case could also be considered a serious setback for 
climate litigators. Two cases, American Electric Power v. Connecticut (2011) and 
Native Village of Kivalina, Alaska v. ExxonMobil (2012) demonstrate this change. Once 
displaced by federal regulation in a particular policy area, a common law claim can no 
longer be heard by federal judges at any level. This displacement helped set the stage 
for novel claims like Juliana’s because public nuisance had been one of the only 
available mechanism through which plaintiffs could bring up harms to the general 




only 4% of Markell and Ruhl’s pre-2012 cases, but the concept has a long history 
within and beyond climate litigation (Markell and Ruhl, 2012, 17). 
Public nuisance is a common law doctrine that protects the public from 
unreasonable interference into their health, safety, or property. Common law principles 
originated centuries ago in medieval England (some can even be traced back to Ancient 
Rome) and derive from traditions rather than policy. Public nuisance cases are not 
always about climate. Notably, the 1998 case leading to a $206 billion settlement from 
tobacco companies was partially based on a public nuisance claim by 46 states. This 
type of “social impact litigation” earns mixed reactions. Either climate nuisance cases 
were right to be displaced since they step on the toes of lawmakers (Miller, 2010, Tribe, 
2010) or they should persist as viable claims since the judicial branch is the only forum 
for a common law claim to be heard (Ewing and Kysar, 2011). Law professors Kysar 
and Ewing contextualize tort law within the bigger picture of common law 
jurisprudence and the relationships between the branches of government. Unlike 
statutory or constitutional claims, public nuisance cases rely entirely on common law—
an area in which the other two branches have no involvement. Thus, the two authors 
argue that “it is wrong to suggest that dismissing climate change cases as nonjusticiable 
political questions merely passes them on to a more suitable branch. Instead, dismissal 
constitutes a backdoor rejection of the substance of the plaintiff’s claims” (Kysar and 
Ewing, 2011, 412).   
The two cases in question, AEP and Kivalina, both began as ordinary public 
nuisance claims that pitted state or local governments against GHG emitters. First, in 




Power on the grounds that their emissions contributed to global warming and therefore 
constituted a public nuisance. This case advanced to the Supreme Court in 2011, which 
unanimously ruled in favor of the power companies. They reached this conclusion by 
interpreting Mass v. EPA to mean that future climate-related cases should rely on the 
statutes like the CAA instead of common law. This precedent was affirmed in Kivalina, 
a case in which climate change led to erosion of the barrier reef holding up the tiny 
town of Kivalina in northern Alaska. The indigenous community was forced to relocate 
and sued ExxonMobil for financial damages. The Ninth Circuit dismissed the case, 
thereby cementing AEP’s interpretation of Mass by telling the plaintiffs in Kivalina that 
they could no longer sue under a theory of public nuisance.  
Beyond the impact on public nuisance, the Supreme Court rulings in Mass and 
AEP signaled the difficulty for climate lawsuits of all kinds moving forward. First, a 5-4 
Supreme Court ruling along ideological lines also reveals the mismatch between 
elements of climate change claims and existing judicial standards. Specifically, standing 
has proven particularly difficult to establish in environmental cases. Supreme Court 
Chief Justice John Roberts cites this among the reasonings for his dissent in Mass, 
stating that the “very concept of global warming seems inconsistent with this 
particularization requirement…and the redress petitioners seek is focused no more on 
them than on the public generally—it is literally to change the atmosphere” 
(Massachusetts v. EPA, 2007). Justice Ginsburg provide the second negative omen for 
climate cases in the majority opinion of AEP. Due to the competing considerations of 
economics, science, and law in climate cases, Ginsburg explains that the “courts are 




should be left alone to make climate change policy since they are “surely better 
equipped to do the job than individual district judges issuing ad hoc, case-by-case 
injunctions” (American Electric Power v. Connecticut, 2011).  
The Supreme Court foreclosed public nuisance in federal courts but did not 
comment on its fate at the state level. With the door still ajar for common law claims in 
state court, a new type of climate suit emerged. One such case is Mayor & City Council 
of Baltimore v. BP p.l.c., in which the city of Baltimore asks that over a dozen oil and 
gas companies pay for the costs of climate change adaptation. Both sides argued before 
the Supreme Court in January 2021 on the narrow yet crucial jurisdictional question: 
would the case stay in state court and keep its nuisance claim, or would the case be 
removed to federal court? Since climate nuisance was displaced by Mass, AEP, and 
Kivalina, a verdict moving the case to federal court would signal a victory for the 
corporations. Based on the “Carbon Majors” database that found 108 companies to be 
responsible for nearly 70% of global emissions dating back to the 1800s, cases like 
Baltimore are quite different from Juliana and invert several of its central values 
(Heede, 2020). Suddenly the government becomes the plaintiff. Instead of a declaration 
of rights, the government asks for money. And instead of prevention, the focus is on 
adaptation. These cases tell quite a different story to Juliana’s Youth v. Gov framing. 
Like Juliana, however, the goal of these cases goes beyond a favorable ruling. Climate 
litigation researcher Joana Setzer writes that a case like Baltimore could be 
“increasingly viewed as a tool to influence policy outcomes and corporate behavior” 
(Setzer and Byrnes 2019, 1). Setzer also describes how the reputational costs for 




common law approach may persist in state court if the finance-focused climate plaintiffs 
can survive motions for removal. While this may seem distantly related to Juliana, the 
first of OCT’s attempts at federal ATL actually faced the same jurisdictional question in 
its common law public trust approach.  
Early Atmospheric Trust Litigation 
Juliana has received international acclaim as the principal incarnation of 
atmospheric trust litigation, but it was not the very beginning of OCT’s campaign to 
hold the federal government accountable on behalf of youth. The first case emerged in 
2011 and was named Alec L v. McCarthy after 17-year-old plaintiff Alec Loorz. Loorz 
also founded a group called iMatter, which partnered with OCT in the case to get young 
people involved in climate activism. The similarities in presentation by Our Children’s 
Trust, in contrast with the crucial legal differences make Alec L an instructive example 
of early ATL to explore. The basic structures of the two actions are quite similar: young 
plaintiffs and at least one organizational plaintiff pitted against several federal agencies, 
a central claim that the government is violating its duty as trustee of the atmosphere for 
young people, and both declaratory and injunctive relief demands. In the press releases 
announcing each case, OCT made similar proclamations; in Alec L, “Youth Sue The 
Government To Preserve The Future And Halt Climate Change,” in Juliana, 
“America’s Youth File Landmark Climate Lawsuit Against U.S. Government and 
President” (Our Children's Trust 2011, 2015). 
Beyond the basic setup and initial presentation, the implementation of the ATL 
theory and reception from the courts was markedly different. In Alec L, the group of 




2011 press release described the federal suit and legal actions in 49 states as “part of the 
international iMatter Campaign” (Our Children's Trust, 2011). The plaintiffs even 
organized a march that would be “the largest-ever mobilization of youth against climate 
change” at the time with “many of the same youth” protesting that “have joined as 
plaintiffs and petitioners in the legal and administrative actions that were filed today” 
(Our Children’s Trust, 2011). Alec L sought “Climate Recovery Plans” as injunctive 
relief that would require carbon emissions to peak by 2012, after which the government 
would ensure that they decreased by “at least” 6 percent every year, accompanied by 
widespread reforestation (Our Children’s Trust, 2011). Juliana still asks for a plan but 
leaves it up to the courts working with the legislature to work out the details. The two 
declaratory relief requests get at the main difference in the cases: Alec L asked for the 
courts to affirm the existence of an atmospheric trust and the government’s 
responsibility, while Juliana asked the courts to say that the government violated the 
youth’s fundamental rights. This addition of constitutional framing to Juliana was the 
biggest change from the first to the second federal suit. 
Alec L was eventually dismissed for a familiar reason. The district court relied 
on a case called PPL Montana (2012), which held that the PTD was a matter of state 
law. But the judge also clarified that, even if the PTD did apply to the federal 
government, the CAA would displace any common law claim following AEP (Alec L 
Memorandum Opinion 2012). The court’s treatment of Alec L shows us how crucial the 
constitutional framing of Juliana proved to be. The novel PTD without the familiar due 
process and equal protections claims to ground it could not launch the first federal ATL 




Section II: Juliana v. United States 
Progression Through the Courts 
The first judicial opinion on Juliana was published in 2016 following two 
motions to dismiss from the defendants. Judge Ann Aiken released a forceful opinion in 
support of the plaintiffs, even saying that she has “no doubt that the right to a climate 
system capable of sustaining human life is fundamental to a free and ordered society” 
(Juliana v. United States, 2016, 32). She famously called the case “no ordinary lawsuit” 
and granted standing to the youth plaintiffs (though she did not consider the future 
generations plaintiff) (Juliana v. United States, 2016, 3). Multiple trial dates have been 
set over the past six years, but none have proceeded due to the government's multitude 
of petitions for the case to be dismissed or delayed. In one instance in 2018, the 
Supreme Court denied both the Trump administration’s application for a stay and their 
request to review the case. After many more legal proceedings (see Table 1), the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals heard oral arguments, which resulted in the January 2020 
ruling that reversed the district court with directions to dismiss the case. The two-judge 
majority concluded that, although the government’s fossil fuel regime represents a 
“clear and present danger,” the court was powerless to act (Juliana v. United States, 
2020). On top of the declaration that their rights were violated, the plaintiffs originally 
asked for a court-supervised plan to reduce the nation’s environmental impact and 
support of the fossil fuel industry. But the majority balked at the idea of becoming 
involved in such complex policy issues. The panel (like many Juliana dissenters) 
decided that addressing climate change is a task best left to legislation, rather than 




Reactions to this setback were mixed. Sabin Center for Climate Change director 
Michael Gerrard was unsurprised, stating that the “courts are good at acting as a shield 
against attempts to disregard laws that are on the books. They’re not going to come up 
with brand new rules. That’s left to the ballot box,” (Carlisle, 2020). On the other hand, 
Director of the Environmental Law Center at Vermont Law School Jennifer Rushlow 
adopted OCT’s view of the dismissal that the court erred by over-simplifying and even 
misinterpreting the request for remedy (Carlisle, 2020). There were even some hopeful 
notes in the ruling for Juliana supporters. The judges remained divided as to their 
ability to alleviate harm but conceded many critical points of the plaintiff’s arguments. 
They acknowledged the injuries suffered by the young people and labeled the 
government’s actions as the direct cause. The third member of the panel, judge 
Josephine Staton, vehemently supported the plaintiff’s case. She writes in her dissent 
that her fellow judges “throw up their hands” by dismissing the case (Juliana v. United 
States, 2020, 33). Rather than stepping back, she argued that the judiciary should be at 
the forefront of complex climate change issues. She was alarmed by the government’s 
insistence “that it has the absolute and unreviewable power to destroy the Nation” 
(Juliana v. United States, 2020, 33). In a forceful rebuke of the majority’s reasoning, 
Staton wrote that: 
in these proceedings, the government accepts as fact that the United 
States has reached a tipping point crying out for a concerted response—
yet presses ahead toward calamity. It is as if an asteroid were barreling 
toward Earth and the government decided to shut down our only 
defenses. (Juliana v. United States, 2020, 32) 
The idea that Juliana’s impact might be felt most beyond its own rulings also emerged 




combined with the narrowness of the dismissal may, according to Yale Law professor 
Daniel Esty open up the door for more litigation to follow (Carlisle, 2020). Given the 
slim 2-1 defeat for Juliana, both Esty and another Yale professor Paul Sabin told TIME 
that another court “with a different set of judges” might reach a different conclusion 
(Carlisle, 2020).  
OCT is now pursuing several different approaches for Juliana to proceed. They 
have filed a motion to amend their 2015 complaint to change the request for redress. 
Instead of asking for the court to work with the legislature to implement an emissions-
reduction plan, the plaintiffs now ask only for a declaration that their rights were 
violated. In the press release announcing the new strategy, OCT states that the updated 
complaint focuses on “winning a declaratory judgment that the nation’s fossil fuel-
based energy system is unconstitutional—much like the plaintiffs in Brown v. Board of 
Education argued the public school system of segregation was unconstitutional” (Our 
Children’s Trust, 2021). On May 13th, 2021, District Court Judge Aiken announced that 
oral arguments on the matter of the amended complaint would be held in June 2021. 
She also ordered attorneys for the plaintiffs and defendants to convene for the first ever 
settlement talks in the case (Our Children’s Trust, 2021). In the meantime, OCT is also 
preparing a petition for the case to be elevated to the Supreme Court in the event that 
their request to amend the complaint is denied.  
Cases Citing Juliana 
In my initial quest to assess the impact of Juliana, I set out to discover whether 
any cases had been filed after 2015 that directly cited or indirectly relied upon the legal 




climate change law. A Westlaw search reveals 30 cases in total: 10 citing the 2016 
District Court ruling and 20 citing the Ninth Circuit decision. Out of these, only 11 raise 
constitutional questions and only two are about climate. The other cases cite Juliana for 
minor procedural reasons or for a more traditional application of the public trust 
doctrine to water rights. For example, a district court ruling from the case with the 
highest “depth” ranking (Westlaw’s quantitative measurement of how much the cited 
case is examined) quotes whole paragraphs of Judge Aiken’s ruling only to state that 
“Juliana was no ordinary lawsuit; Juliana does not support Plaintiff’s position on this 
issue” (Lewis v. United States, 2019). In all but two of these examples, the citation of 
Juliana is just in passing. These cases do not attempt anything like ATL, nor do they 
mimic OCT’s specific legal framework (minus one example of plagiarism).3 The two 
cases that were inspired by Juliana demonstrate the early impact the case has had on 
climate litigation and illuminate how the different aspects of Juliana’s argument could 
be applied creatively to new situations, whether successful or not.  
Clean Air Council v. United States 
In 2017, environmental non-profit Clean Air Council (CAC) requested a 
declaration from a Pennsylvania district court that the rollback program of President 
Obama’s climate change regulations by President Trump constituted a violation of their 
fundamental rights. Specifically, CAC invokes the public trust doctrine, 5th Amendment 
                                                        
3After learning about Juliana from a 60 Minutes segment, psychologist Dr. Christian Komor asked OCT 
to amend Juliana to incorporate the experimental technique of algae sequestration to capture GHG 
emissions into their request. When OCT declined, he plagiarized large parts of Juliana’s complaint to 
represent himself in his own suit Komor v. United States. The Arizona Federal Court stayed the 





Due Process, and 9th Amendment unenumerated rights to justify their claim. Like 
Juliana, the case has youth plaintiffs, though the Clean Air Council itself is the lead 
plaintiff. Three aspects of Clean Air Council make it notable: the different defendant 
targeted in CAC as opposed to Juliana, CAC’s reliance on Juliana’s exhaustive 
investigation into government awareness of climate change, and the contrast between 
the mixed judicial reception to Juliana and harsh dismissal of CAC. 
The Obama and Trump administrations were initially named in Juliana, but they 
were dismissed as defendants by Judge Aiken who determined the federal agency 
defendants to be sufficient if the case ever got to the point of receiving its requested 
remedy (Our Children’s Trust, 2018). Further, OCT consistently clarified that the case 
was about government actions as a whole, rather than whoever was in the Oval Office 
(Our Children’s Trust, 2018). Clean Air Council, on the other hand, pointed to the pivot 
from the Obama administration that, “recognizing the imminent dangers presented by 
climate change…undertook steps in the last decade to reduce the threats and protect 
United States citizens and planet” to the Trump administration that “embarked on a 
program of reversing, unravelling, dismantling, and eliminating” the recent progress 
(Clean Air Council Complaint, 2017, 9). This framing of the Obama-era federal 
government’s actions is crucial for CAC’s public trust claim since it allows them to 
argue that by 
acting to prevent the devastating and life-endangering consequences of 
climate change, the United States Government has acknowledged its 
obligation as the trustee of our country’s natural resources not to take 
affirmative acts to enhance, increase, or intensify those dangers. (Clean 




But it also reduces the scale of the problem; if rolling back the changes made by the 
Trump administration in 2017 alone would serve as remedy for the CAC plaintiffs, then 
that is quite different from Juliana’s story. Juliana’s intentionally apolitical claim of 
overarching government failure over the past half century makes it less likely that a 
judge would feel they were intruding on the purview of the executive branch like the 
CAC court feared.  
Clean Air Council further relies on Juliana for the exhaustive investigation that 
OCT conducted into the long history of government awareness and disregard of climate 
change. Not only is Juliana providing an official record of the science behind climate 
change and the government’s acknowledgement thereof, but the legal strategy of the 
defendants does not deny any of these facts. This admittance is key—future cases can 
build upon the basis that “the United States Government has been and is aware of the 
severe consequences of climate change…and admitted the existence of most of them in 
Juliana v. United States” (Clean Air Council Complaint 2017, 25). In subsequent cases 
like CAC, the government can no longer quibble over whether climate change exists, 
thanks to the record provided by Juliana. Even if Juliana’s journey ends with the 9th 
Circuit dismissal, the evidence that “the United States admitted in Juliana that officials 
and persons in the Federal Government have been aware of the evidence of climate 
change, its causes, and its consequences for over fifty years” could serve to benefit 
future lawsuits (Clean Air Council Complaint 2017, 26). By conceding that climate 
change is an undisputed problem but arguing that the courts are the wrong branch of 
government to attempt to solve it, the defendants in Juliana provide a foundation for 




The third and final reason why Clean Air Council is instructive for the potential 
pathways that Juliana could provide to citing cases is less optimistic. CAC was 
dismissed in 2019 at the district court level in a particularly negative opinion. Judge 
Diamond first denied the standing of the non-profit to bring a claim on its members 
behalf, then considered and rejected each prong of standing for the Clean Air Council 
individual plaintiffs. In one instance, Judge Diamond writes that it would be “absurd” 
for him to trace the specific challenged actions of the defendants to the plaintiff’s 
alleged injuries. And it does sound absurd when Judge Diamond singles out individual 
actions by the defendants (like the EPA deleting its climate science website or President 
Trump firing Secretary of State Rex Tillerson) that the plaintiffs had treated as a 
collective pattern of behavior (Clean Air Council, 2019, 11).  
While a procedural reason would have been sufficient to dismiss the case, Judge 
Diamond went further and provided an “alternative” dismissal that tore apart each of the 
legal arguments (Clean Air Council, 2019, 14). According to Judge Diamond, there is 
no due process right to environmental quality, the 9th Amendment does not support their 
claims, and the public trust claim “has no basis in law” (Clean Air Council Opinion, 
2019, 14). The opening paragraph of the opinion is particularly forceful in its 
interpretation of the plaintiff’s request for relief. It was a big ask; the plaintiffs 
requested the declaration that defendants “cannot effectuate or promulgate any rollbacks 
that increase the frequency and/or intensity of the life-threatening effects of climate 
change” (Clean Air Council, 2019, 1). Judge Diamond fears that this would “effectively 
ask me to supervise any actions that the President and his appointees take that might 




“neither the authority nor inclination to assume control of the Executive Branch” he 
granted the motion to dismiss.  
Not only was Clean Air Council’s application of Juliana’s legal framework 
unfounded according to Judge Diamond, but he also suggests that the decision in 
Juliana was wrong in the first place. Since both decisions were at the same level and in 
different districts, neither can overturn the other. But Diamond can still call Aiken’s 
reasoning “less than persuasive” that “certainly contravened or ignored longstanding 
authority” (Clean Air Council Opinion, 2019, 15-25). While one district court judge 
calling another’s ruling unimpressive is not enough to signal a trend in post-Juliana 
litigation, Judge Diamond does invoke a long list of cases that combine to form a 
massive barrier to any claim of a constitutional right to a pollution-free environment. 
This harkens back to the “judicial baggage” possibility that Markell and Ruhl 
introduced (Markell and Ruhl, 2012, 62) and demonstrates the uniqueness of Juliana. 
Despite the similarity of the legal arguments and the timing (after the 2016 ruling in 
favor of the Juliana plaintiffs but before the Ninth Circuit 2020 dismissal), CAC 
demonstrates the barriers in place that make climate litigation so difficult. 
Animal Legal Defense Fund v. United States 
The second relevant case using Juliana’s fundamental rights argument is Animal 
Legal Defense Fund v. United States (2019). This case was filed in the district court of 
Oregon by two non-profit environmental groups on behalf of all of their members, three 
adults, one youth plaintiff, and a representative of future generations—making it the 
first outside of OCT’s ATL campaign to assert standing for future generations. This 




right to a safe and sustainable environment: the right to be alone in the wilderness. They 
justify building upon the stable climate right, which had not yet been overruled by the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, by quoting Juliana to state that “a right that is a 
‘necessary condition to exercising a fundamental right may itself be implied as 
fundamental” (ALDF Original Complaint 2018, 59). In Juliana, a stable climate is 
required to exercise the rights to life, liberty, and property. ALDF extends that to say 
that “the freedom to choose not to associate by seeking solitude in wilderness” is 
essential in order to exercise that right to a stable climate (ALDF Original Complaint, 
2018, 60). The original ALDF complaint cites a long history of privacy cases to 
demonstrate how that right has expanded into new areas over the years and how this 
would just be an extension of already existing ideas. The government defendants 
countered that position by arguing that the freedom to be alone in wilderness is too far 
afield and too narrow to be encompassed by any existing constitutional right (Sullivan, 
2019). This case makes a natural law argument to suggest that the right to be free in 
wilderness has always existed implicitly, similar to the justification of the PTD by 
intergenerational justice scholars. However, the link between the Posterity clause of the 
Preamble to the Constitution and the goal of preserving livable conditions for future 
generations is a significantly more direct than between “the concept of freedom as 
political separation from others” and the words “We the People” (ALDF Original 
Complaint, 2018, 5). ALDF was dismissed at the district court level when the judge did 
not grant standing, nor found merit in any of the legal claims. Though ALDF inverted 




two substantive citations of Juliana, ALDF shows the potential for Juliana to be 
invoked in pursuit of even more novel constitutional claims. 
Victories Beyond Favorable Rulings 
One genre of legal literature particularly relevant to my research explores the 
opportunities for climate litigation to achieve meaningful benefits without necessarily 
receiving a favorable ruling in court. These potential benefits for Juliana are threefold: 
the case and surrounding media campaign by OCT could help to catalyze legislative 
action, update judicial standards by pushing past procedural hurdles to set the stage for 
future cases, or shaping larger public narrative regarding the case’s significance and the 
urgency of the climate crisis.  
Catalyzing Legislative Action 
In a Student Note in the Harvard Environmental Law Review Nathaniel Levy 
argues that “Juliana can—win or lose—lead to constructive legal and political responses 
to climate change” (Levy, 2019, 1). Levy discusses “availability cascades,” which occur 
when information with a specific point of view about a topic becomes rapidly available. 
When this happens, Levy explains that people who are unsure of their stance on the 
issue are more likely to accept the newly prevalent viewpoint (Levy, 2019, 3). Levy 
identifies availability cascades in the emergence of environmental law, from the 
enactment of early pollution statutes to Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring and DDT 
regulation. He asks how the success of previous availability cascades can be replicated 
within the context of climate litigation and determines that “advocates might be able to 




whatever the outcome—into political messaging and communications designed to 
rapidly move climate to the top of the policymaker’s to-do lists” (Levy, 2019, 13). 
Juliana is especially suited to gain the attention of lawmakers and the general public 
because “litigation, like the judicial decisions it can yield has expressive or symbolic 
value, especially when it seeks the recognition or vindication of constitutional rights” 
(Levy, 2019, 9). Juliana has already made progress towards that goal. In September 
2020, a handful of Senators and Representatives introduced the Children’s Fundamental 
Rights and Climate Recovery Resolution which “supports the principles underpinning 
Juliana” by “stating that a stable climate system is fundamental to a free and ordered 
society and is preservative of other fundamental rights” (Our Children’s Trust, 2020). 
The joint resolutions in the House and Senate were reintroduced on Earth Day, 2021. 
Motivating new legislative action is just one of the possible achievements for Juliana 
outside of court.    
Easing Standing Requirements 
Beyond legislative connections, another way that novel legal cases like Juliana 
can make their mark is procedural. In “Will Climate Change the Courts?” journalist 
David Murray argues that by considering Juliana on its merits, decisions like Aiken’s 
2016 ruling loosen standing requirements for future cases (Murray, 2019). If the courts 
ended up accepting injury shared worldwide, causation by the whole federal 
government, and either the injunctive or declaratory relief, climate cases would have to 
clear a lower hurdle in the future. Murray and Justice Department attorney Jeff Clark, 
who told the Ninth Circuit during oral arguments that the case would “change standing 




make the courts more amenable to the types of claims they file as the climate crisis 
advances. Juliana was denied by the Ninth Circuit on the basis of redressability, but 
with oral arguments to consider amending the original complaint scheduled for June 
25th, 2021, the potential for Juliana to update the injury and causation standards is not 
entirely shut off.   
The Power of Narrative 
To understand the potential for the narrative power of Juliana to aid the case 
itself and future climate cases, we first must examine how scholars think about legal 
storytelling. Executive Director of the Sabin Center for Climate Change Law Michael 
Burger writes that there is a “dynamic relationship between law, literature, and 
narrative”—even to the point of viewing all of environmental law “as a battle” between 
“competing stories” (Burger, 2013, 1-12). Law professors Ewing and Kysar add to this 
framing by proposing that novel legal arguments be viewed as moves in a cultural and 
political debate over society’s basic values (Ewing and Kysar, 2011, 350). They argue 
that common law and constitutional cases like Juliana frame their issues in terms of 
“compelling victim narratives,” which allows them to “push past special interests and 
congressional inertia” (Ewing and Kysar, 2011, 371). Although going to trial and 
receiving recognition that the government violated the plaintiff’s fundamental rights are 
the stated goals of Juliana, the case continues to benefit from media attention and 
catalyze public debate the longer it stretches on; Kysar and Ewing argue that 
achievements of this nature are valuable in their own right (Kysar and Ewing 2011, 
350). Kysar later returns to the idea of legal narrative in light of Juliana, writing that the 




“humility, stewardship, and responsibility toward future generations,” departures from 
which “risk catastrophic collapse” (Kysar and Weaver, 2017, 352). These four legal 
scholars describe the power of storytelling to extend litigation beyond the courtroom, 
which helps to bridge the gap between climate litigation and activism by consolidating 
their methods and goals.   
The narrative aspect is evidently important for OCT, which has used the sizeable 
attention gained from suing the federal government to raise awareness about the 
pressing urgency of climate change. Even beyond the courtroom, OCT makes an effort 
to spotlight the plaintiffs. The documentary about the case focuses on the lives of the 
plaintiffs to tell a story “about more than just a lawsuit” of “empowered youth finding 
their voices and fighting to protect their rights and our collective future” (YOUTH V. 
GOV, 2021). Compelling victim narratives also appear throughout the initial Juliana 
complaint, which dedicated over 80 paragraphs to the plaintiffs’ injuries. Self-described 
scholar, storyteller, and climate justice advocate Grace Nosek highlights the work of 
OCT in this area in a 2018 law review titled “Climate Change Litigation and Narrative: 
How to Use Litigation to Tell Compelling Climate Stories” (Nosek, 2018, 734). 
Although climate harms may “seem distant in time and space” and “less visceral than 
other threats,” Nosek argues that “litigation offers a unique opportunity to reframe…and 
overcome” this challenge (Nosek, 2018, 734). For Nosek, who gets to tell the story of a 
lawsuit can be as important as the legal merits. The communicators for Juliana are often 
the plaintiffs, who make the already “vivid description of climate threats” employed by 
the case “even more salient to the American public given [their] age” (Nosek 2018, 




gave life to the lawsuit” (Martinez, 2017, 47). Plaintiff Xuihtezcatl Martinez writes it 
was important for every plaintiff to attend the court hearings because they “wanted the 
judge to see who we were, so he could put a face to this lawsuit” (Martinez, 2017, 47). 
In addition to the role of the plaintiffs, other features of OCT’s climate framing that 
Nosek highlights include the all-encompassing scale and “how the case centers blame” 
(Nosek, 2011, 790). 
One specific way in which OCT advances the narrative of Juliana in order to 
make the public feel invested and support the plight of the plaintiffs is by drawing 
frequent comparisons to Brown v. Board of Education (1954). There are two reasons 
why this connection helps Juliana. First, the comparison emphasizes the significance of 
the youth’s discrimination claim. In the press release first announcing the filing of 
Juliana, OCT writes that they “seek judicial action no less important, from a strictly 
legal basis, than Brown v. Board of Education” (Our Children’s Trust, 2015). OCT later 
writes that:  
The climate movement aligns with the historic civil rights movement 
which once again is being led by the nation’s courageous youth. In 
Brown v. Board of Education, children fought for their constitutional 
rights and sought a court order to desegregate schools. The Juliana 
plaintiffs are similarly fighting for their constitutional rights to a stable 
climate system, so that their generation and future generations can 
flourish. An additional parallel is evident as today’s youth demand racial 
justice and environmental justice, two issues especially intertwined given 
the disproportionate impact of climate change on BIPOC and frontline 
youth and communities. (Our Children’s Trust, 2021) 
Plaintiff Aji Piper affirms these parallels, stating that “climate change is no different” 
from the lingering effects of segregation he grew up with (Our Children’s Trust, 2021). 
The second benefit to Juliana from drawing connections to the historic civil rights case 




both the recognition of a fundamental right that the government had been violating, and 
a court-supervised plan to remedy the newly recognized discrimination. During 
December 2017 oral arguments Julia Olson reminded a panel of Ninth Circuit judges 
that Juliana is not the first case to ask for dramatic remedy to a novel discrimination 




Section III: Youth Activism on Climate Change 
Young people who want to catalyze change are not limited to the courtroom. 
Activists have been marching, striking, litigating, and lobbying for various 
environmental pursuits for centuries. But up until recently, the movement was 
pioneered by adults. In 2013, the United Nations asked teenagers from around the world 
what issues mattered to them most and learned that education, health, and jobs took 
precedent over “action on climate change,” which ranked dead last (Cocco-Klein and 
Mauger, 2018, 93). However, these priorities changed dramatically in the late 2010s. A 
few big moments exemplify the shift: the US branch of the September 2019 school 
strike for climate that attracted over four million marchers worldwide was organized by 
a group of 13-16-year-olds. That same week, then 16-year-old Greta Thunberg 
addressed the UN General Assembly and 30,000 signed OCT’s “Young People’s Brief” 
in support of Juliana proceeding to trial. Not only has the age of the strikers shifted, but 
the message is also different. As Juliana plaintiff and [activism job] puts it, “climate 
change isn’t just about temperature and weather, it’s about people” (Mignucci, 2017). 
By reframing climate change as an issue of justice, youth activists move in the same 
direction as Juliana, albeit in a different venue and with different potential outcomes. 
This section will provide context for the older climate movement; then it will consider 
four possible reasons that experts have proposed to explain the youthful shift in the 
climate movement. Finally, this section will examine three communication tools in 
common between Juliana and climate activists and what that might tell us about the 




Contextualizing the Youth Climate Movement 
To understand how the modern climate activist movement might have changed, 
we first need background information on how environmentalism used to be. In a 
University of Washington blog, Master’s student Karin Otsuka zooms out to see how 
the shape of the environmental movement has evolved from the late 1800s to present 
day (Otsuka, 2019). When the American conservation movement began, the participants 
were motivated by notions of “preservation, such as maintaining wilderness for 
leisurely activities, sustaining natural resources for future generations, or having a 
pristine environment free from human presence” (Otsuka, 2019). These values evolved 
into the “mainstream environmentalism” of the 1960s in order to respond to crises of 
the time like chemical exposure, industrial pollution, and overpopulation which were 
“at the forefront of concern for the white, urban environmentalists” (Otsuka, 2019). The 
varied embodiments of mainstream environmentalism shared several common goals, 
including the preservation of pristine wilderness for its own sake. However, when the 
issues confronting the activists began to change, so too did the movement. Reminiscent 
of the shift in focus away from individual instances of harm that environmental 
litigation has undergone, Otsuka observes that activists in the late 1990s faced “a great 
challenge in framing climate change” since “up until this point, issues of environmental 
degradation have been largely visible and localized, directly impacting individuals and 
communities” (Otsuka, 2019). Old tactics like direct appeals to lawmakers 
demonstrating visible harm, or even emotional campaigns to save the polar bear or slow 




Mainstream environmentalism was not the only branch of the movement. In an 
article in The Atlantic called “Environmentalism Was Once a Social-Justice 
Movement,” Columbia Law Professor Britton-Purdy explains how environmental-
justice arose as a critique of mainstream environmentalism that was “too elite, too 
white, and too focused on beautiful scenery and charismatic species” (Britton-Purdy, 
2016). UC Davis professor and founding director of the Environmental Justice Project 
Julie Sze makes the origin story more explicit, stating that “[e]nvironmental justice (EJ) 
was formulated in the United States in response to the articulation of environmental 
racism (ER),” which “suggests that race and racism are independent factors that 
influence environmental harms” (Sze, 2020, 10). Otsuka further describes the 
formulation as a response to the focus of groundbreaking works like Rachel Carson’s 
Silent Spring, writing that Carson focused on the impacts to “urban, white, and Anglo 
Americans” which “misses the Latino, black, Native American, and low-income white 
families disproportionately exposed to pollution throughout this time period and 
continuing to this day” (Otsuka, 2019). The EJ movement “connects race, class, 
indigeneity, gender, and environmentalism and fundamentally involves social justice” 
in order to correct present injustices (Sze, 2020, 5). There is even a litigation branch of 
EJ, which confronts inequities in distribution of environmental resources or harm (Cole, 
1994). But this legal strategy is rarely successful since the plaintiffs must prove that the 
discrimination they faced was intentional, rather than coincidental (King, 2020). The 
current campaign of youth activism is not quite the same as EJ because the justice in 
question is more intergenerational than race or class-based, but the limitations of 




Why the youthful shift? 
Technology 
A central component of the messages of youth activists, and the news coverage 
surrounding them, revolves around why young people should lead the movement. One 
reason for their involvement is practical—Earth Guardians youth leader and Juliana 
plaintiff Xuihtezcatl Martinez explains that young people “have a greater understanding 
of technology because we grew up with it” which allows them to create movements that 
are “more global, more connected, more diverse, younger, and more intergenerational 
than ever before” (Young-Powell, 2019). Technology provides a platform with which 
activists can organize worldwide movements or even appeal directly to decision-
makers. New York Times reporter Somini Sengupta writes that “at a time of fraying trust 
in authority figures, children—who by definition have no authority over anything—are 
increasingly driving the debate” which they are able to do “[u]sing the internet…like no 
generation before them” (Sengupta, 2019). This, for Sengupta, explains why “though 
their outsize demands for an end to fossil fuels mirror those of older environmentalists, 
their movement has captured the public imagination far more effectively” (Sengupta, 
2019). This logistical reason can help explain how the marches and strikes grow so 
large but does not fully encapsulate why young people in particular are positioned to 
effectively communicate their new messages.    
Youthful thinking 
The second reason is also practical; in addition to technology, Xuihtezcatl 




urgency (Young-Powell, 2019). And brain science could help support this theory. In a 
2019 article titled “How Youth Have Changed the Climate Movement,” sociologist 
Mike Males cites research to explain why teens could have “broader, more flexible 
thinking” (Males, 2019). It comes down to the “wide-open neural connections in 
adolescence, while the ‘pruning’ of neural pathways as adulthood progresses renders 
adult brains more efficient for a narrower range of tasks” (Males, 2019). Males also 
argues that “[y]outhful thinking across multiple dimensions is better at imagining 
innovative policies to adapt to future contingencies; elder thinking is suited to resolving 
the practicalities” which means that older leaders “fixate on the short-range dollars-and-
cents costs of change, while the climate-strike youth focus on the long-term price of 
inaction” (Males, 2019). These first two suggestions—technology and perspective—
contribute to the position that young people should take the lead in climate activism.  
Moral authority 
A third explanation for the boom in youth-led initiatives is that the presence of 
young people in decision-making spaces makes the concept of future generations seem 
more immediate for older leaders. Senior Advisor and Associate Director of non-profit 
organization Equity for Children Samantha Cocco-Klein and Beatrice Mauger argue 
that children, “as representatives of the ‘generation most affected,’ have a unique role in 
advocating for mitigation policy” (Cocco-Klein and Mauger, 2018, 90). They explain 
that young people “can play an important role in motivating action by adults, by making 
the issue more immediate and personally relevant” (Cocco-Klein and Mauger, 2018, 
94). Climate change may seem to be a far-off threat that will not catastrophically impact 




“[r]isks to one’s own children are more likely to elicit action than appeals for 
generalized and hazy ‘future generations’” (Cocco-Klein and Mauger, 2018, 94).  
The inclusion of youth could do more than make the future seem closer. 
University of Leeds environmental social scientist Harriet Thew researched the role of 
14-24-year-old participants in UN climate negotiations and found that “adults perceive 
these activists as having greater moral integrity” (Marris, 2019). Thew argues that 
young people are most effective as messengers in adult-dominated spaces when they 
highlight their own present vulnerability. Because youth activists represent themselves 
and are not career-motivated, adults often view them as having an “unvarnished” view 
(Marris, 2019, Sengupta, 2019). Cocco-Klein and Mauger also suggest the benefits of 
youth for climate activism and even cite OCT for support. Specifically, they reference 
Alec L’s partnership with the iMatter organization. The two authors explain how iMatter 
“re-focused their campaign on mobilizing young people” who “rely on their ‘moral 
authority’ to shift decision-making away from a focus on the present to one in which the 
interests of future generations are also given considerations” (Cocco-Klein & Mauger, 
2018). By highlighting the unique role of young people within the context of adult 
decision-making spaces, Cocco-Klein, Mauger, and Thew contribute to the explanation 
behind the increased activism that relies on their status and characteristics as young 
people. This is part of the story but is not enough to fully explain the drastic shift in 
climate activist movements in recent years.  
Shut out of the political process 
The fourth and final potential reason behind the frequent dichotomy of young 




and, thus, their interests are often pushed aside. Activism (or litigation) can provide a 
platform with which impassioned young people can gain political capital. The problem 
was exemplified in 2019, when a small class of young activists from a group called the 
Sunrise Movement travelled from California to Washington, D.C. to meet with their 
recently re-elected Senator, Dianne Feinstein. They planned to present her with their 
hand-written, brightly colored letters advocating for the Green New Deal and warning 
of the urgency of climate change, and they hoped that the Senator would listen to them. 
Instead, Feinstein denounced the youth. She did not want their Green New Deal; she 
had her own “with a much better chance of passing,” nor did she want their feedback. 
The Senator responds to one girl’s worries that “scientists have said we have 12 years to 
turn this around,” with “well, it’s not going to get turned around in 10 years.” Before 
the group could present their letter, the Senator touts her own 30 years in office and 
dismisses the group who “come in here and say it has to be my way or the highway. 
I’ve gotten elected…maybe people should listen a bit” (Guardian News, 2019). The clip 
went viral, with over 200,000 views on the original video and even a Saturday Night 
Live parody of the episode (Saturday Night Live, 2019). But this was not an isolated 
incident for many young activists who view Senator Feinstein’s casual rejection as 
representative of the larger obstacles youth face when attempting to do something about 
climate change. 
The perspective that those who are too young to vote are also too young to 
deserve political attention partially motivated the US arm of the global climate strike in 
2019. The lead organizers, then-13-16-year-olds Isra Hirsi, Haven Coleman, and 




“Adults won’t take climate change seriously. So we, the youth, are forced to strike” 
(Hirsi, Coleman, and Villaseñor 2019). They reference Senator Feinstein’s rejection of 
the Sunrise Movement to point out that the Senator “will not have to face the 
consequences of her inaction on climate change” (Hirsi, Coleman, & Villaseñor, 2019). 
They make the accusation of political inaction explicit, stating “we strike because our 
world leaders haven’t acknowledged, prioritized, or properly addressed the climate 
crisis” and instead “play political games” (Hirsi, Coleman, & Villaseñor, 2019). As the 
currently living generation that will be most impacted by climate change, it is 
unsurprising that young people turn to activism to attempt to gain a voice in the political 
process. However, the young age of activists is not enough to explain why their 
priorities have also changed. To understand how youth activism and Juliana may be 
two pieces of the same puzzle, we must examine what the youth activists are saying.  
How has the message changed?  
The youth climate activist movement is broad, dynamic, and does not refer to 
any one coordinated program. However, by examining the repeated themes of a few 
prominent figures in the movement, we can see three small but significant shifts in the 
priorities of the broader youth climate activist movement. As the stories of climate 
activism and litigation move more in line with one another, these three changes can help 
illuminate that connection and demonstrate how lawsuits like Juliana can also serve as 
a form of activism. This viewpoint reframes the goal of litigation beyond a favorable 
ruling to include the goals shared by youth activists. These three priorities involve 
incorporating intergenerational justice via language of betrayal, pinpointing blame, and 





Intergenerational justice is a constant feature of climate change conversations. 
Juliana realizes this concept through the public trust doctrine, which positions the 
federal government as owing a duty of care to the atmosphere for the sake of future 
generations. Greta Thunberg communicates the same basic idea, but in simpler and 
more explicit language. She says that she speaks “on behalf of future generations” and 
tries to make far away threats seem present by explaining that “if I live to be 100, I will 
be alive in the year 2103. When you think about ‘the future’ today, you don’t think 
beyond the year 2050…What happens next?” (Thunberg, 2019, 5). At the 2018 UN 
Climate Change Conference she addressed the leaders in the audience directly, stating 
that “you say that you love your children above anything else. And yet you are stealing 
their future” (Thunberg, 2019, 14). She argues that their “future was sold so that a small 
number of people could make unimagineable amounts of money. It was stolen from us 
every time you said that the sky was the limit, and that you only live once” (Thunberg, 
2019, 56). Others like OCT Washington plaintiff and co-founder of youth-led activist 
group Zero Hour Jamie Margolin echo this message. Speaking before Congress in 2019, 
Margolin likened government involvement with climate change to “a knife to the heart” 
(Margolin, 2019). Further saying that the politicians she addresses chose “’their wallets 
over their children. It’s very devastating and scary but also it feels like we’ve been 
betrayed” (Margolin, 2019). Her fellow Zero Hour co-founder Nadia Nazar testifies that 
“what disappoints many other youth and I, is that there are elected officials prioritizing 




In line with Harriet Thew’s research, Greta Thunberg invokes her moral 
authority as a member of the youngest generation. In one of her first speeches at a 2018 
climate march in Stockholm, Thunberg told newspapers, influencers, and politicians 
that “the future of all coming generations rests on your shoulders,” and even further, 
“our lives are in your hands” (Thunberg, 2019, 4). And the way her target audiences can 
fulfill the obligation is not via encouragement, but through action (Thunberg, 2019, 22). 
“The bigger your carbon footprint—the bigger your moral duty. The bigger your 
platform—the bigger your responsibility” (Thunberg, 2019, 4). She acknowledges at the 
UN Climate Change Conference in 2018, to the European Parliament in 2019, at the 
Austrian World Summit in 2019, and to the Montreal Week for Future Climate Strike in 
2019 that stopping, or even reducing, emissions would be unpopular, uncomfortable, 
and unprofitable for the leaders in her audiences. But she does not care and urges them 
to give back the childhood they have stolen from her (Thunberg, 2019, 96). For 
Thunberg and for Juliana, elected officials owe it to young people and future 
generations to preserve their future and they are currently violating that obligation. By 
framing lax emissions regulations or endorsement of the fossil fuel industry as an 
intentional betrayal, activists like Thunberg feed into the second narrative shift: the 
narrowing assignment of blame.    
Assigning blame 
A second way that youth activists communicate their message of climate justice 
effectively is by identifying those who contribute the most to climate change and 
absolving the young, people in low-emitting countries, and future generations of blame. 




climate change. She calls it a “convenient lie” that “climate change is something that we 
have all created” (Thunberg, 2019, 15). Assigning responsibility to leaders of countries 
that emit astronomical levels of GHGs without even attempting to meet the obligations 
they signed on to in the 2017 Paris Agreement is important for Thunberg “because if 
everyone is guilty then no one is to blame. And someone is to blame” (Thunberg, 2019, 
15). In 11 of the 16 speeches in her book, Thunberg uses the apportionment of blame to 
highlight the equity aspect of the Paris Agreement. She makes sure to mention in her 
speeches that she and the leaders she addresses “are the lucky ones. Those who will be 
affected the hardest are already suffering the consequences. But their voices are not 
heard” (Thunberg, 2019, 57).  
Both Juliana and Thunberg hold elected officials accountable over violating 
their rights, rather than corporations or private individuals for violating their property 
interests. In court, Juliana is able to pinpont blame by demonstrating the causation 
aspect of standing and (if ultimately successful) proving that the government violated 
their public trust obligation and the plaintiffs’ right to a stable climate. OCT also 
advances this goal outside of court documents. In a 2018 press release, OCT 
emphasizes the fact that “Juliana v. United States is not about the government’s failure 
to act on climate” (Our Children’s Trust, 2018). Instead, the governments “affirmative 
actions” cause the harm in question (Our Children’s Trust, 2018). This assignment of 
blame also connects back to scholar Grace Nosek’s argument that OCT’s strength lies 
in its compelling storytelling. She writes that by detailing how the federal government 
knew about climate change for decades, the Juliana plaintiffs frame the “public health 




that risk” (Nosek, 2018, 791). It is easy to look at a global problem like climate change 
and attribute the blame equally to everyone, but the youth plaintiffs and activists 
attempt to demonstrate that this is not the case. By addressing politicians in particular, 
both Juliana and youth activists seek to make the sometimes-abstract harm of climate 
change concrete and visible.  
Invoking the past  
Climate activists reference successful social justice, activist, or political 
campaigns in the past to signify the gravity of their own movement. Two frequent 
references are the 1930s New Deal and the Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s and 
60s. Young organizers like Hirsi, Coleman, Villaseñor invoke the New Deal in order to 
justify their support for proposed congressional resolution, the Green New Deal. They 
argue that “as the original New Deal was to the declining US economy, the Green New 
Deal is to our changing climate” (Hirsi, Coleman, & Villaseñor, 2019). Beyond 
justifying the Green New Deal, the New Deal references solidify the connections 
between climate, jobs, health, and social justice—which, as the 2013 UN survey of 
youth indicated, was lacking from previous conceptions of climate change policy. 
Director of the Green New Deal Strategy at think tank Data for Progress Julian Noisecat 
makes the connection explicit by saying “we’re trying to build the climate equivalent of 
the civil rights movement” (Goodell, 2019). It is no longer just about melting glaciers or 
planting trees, now the goal is “articulating the dream of a better world” (Goodell, 
2019).  
While Juliana cites and references historic civil rights cases in its legal 




Juliana plaintiff and Fellow with the Alliance for Climate Education Vic Barrett, the 
connections are clear. While testifying before Congress alongside Margolin and 
Thunberg, he argues that “just as my federal government sanctioned discrimination in 
schools and housing until the middle of the last century, a policy that harmed children, 
my federal government has also orchestrated and sanctioned a system of fossil fuel 
energy that is harming children in another way” (Barrett, 2019). He reinforces the 
Youth v. Gov framing by explaining how “Like youth who have come before us in the 
Civil Rights movement and other social movements it is often the youth that must shine 
a light on systems of injustice” (Barret, 2019).  
The Juliana plaintiffs know that the lawsuit’s goals extend beyond the 
courtroom. Speaking online at the Public Interest Environmental Law conference, 21-
year-old Vic Barrett is introduced as a climate activist first and plaintiff in Juliana 
second. He explains that “being a plaintiff on this case was never and it’s never going to 
be just about what’s written in our complaints, it’s about what we’ve experienced, what 
we’ve seen in our lives” (Barrett, 2020). Barrett describes how his fellow young 
activists were surprised when he joined the lawsuit as a plaintiff. Even though a case 
like Juliana is radical within the context of environmental law, suing the federal 
government is still “inside action” for Barrett because it involves working within a 
system that he perceives to be largely broken (Barrett, 2020). However, he also learned 
as a plaintiff that young activists should “be willing to see that the change that you don’t 
think is the most radical” since “things that we don’t think of as diverse, creative, 
complex, or radical like law and legal action can be—and can bolster the radical 




2020). Barrett is not the only Juliana plaintiff who learned that a lawsuit can be another 
form of activism. Xuihtezcatl Martinez, wrote in his 2017 book We Rise that he believes 
“that as activists in this country it is important to know when to use the existing systems 
to create change” (Martinez, 2017, 46). By joining Juliana, Martinez “had an 
opportunity to do so from the inside out and infiltrate the system to demand that the 
government uphold our interests” (Martinez, 2017, 46). These two plaintiffs put forth 
the perspective of law and activism as two vital pieces that complement and complete 





Despite ever-increasing warnings from climate scientists that the current levels 
of emissions are unsustainable, the United States government continues to invest in the 
fossil fuel industry, thereby exacerbating the crisis. Dissatisfied with the government’s 
inaction and worried for the future of her children, Julia Olson at OCT launched the 
ATL campaign in 2011 to hold the legislators and executive accountable via the third 
branch. The first attempt, Alec L v. McCarthy, that relied solely on the novel application 
of the PTD to atmosphere, was quickly dismissed and Juliana has met been met with 
mixed reception. However, legal scholarship largely answers “yes” to the question of 
whether climate change mitigation can be pursued via litigation. These scholars provide 
the background of how intergenerational justice and the PTD underpin the 
constitutional protections the courts exist to protect, which is crucial to understanding 
Juliana’s legal arguments.  
Next, this thesis traces the trajectory of climate in the courts. Beginning with a 
field of statutory and nuisance claims, we see how success for climate plaintiffs was 
rare—and incremental when achieved. Juliana emerged in 2015 and disrupted the field 
with its constitutional framework, combined with its application of the ancient yet 
rarely used Public Trust Doctrine (PTD), the involvement of charismatic young 
plaintiffs, and the fact that the entire federal government (rather than an individual 
emitter) is the target of the suit. Win or lose, Juliana’s compelling narrative and 
connection to modern youth activism could advance the case for climate in the courts 




Finally, this thesis extends beyond the legal analysis to incorporate the aspect of 
activism, which is a vital way for young people shut out of the political process to gain 
a voice. Where Juliana invokes the PTD, activists reckon with intergenerational justice 
through language of betrayal. If by naming the federal government as defendant, 
Juliana narrows the blame for a global crisis, activists assign blame explicitly by calling 
our world leaders. Juliana invokes Brown v. Board to communicate the gravity of the 
rights being violated; youth activists do the same by referencing historic movements 
that advanced their causes. By bringing both the legal and activist modes of action into 
the same conversation, we can see how they use the same narrative tactics to advance 
their message. Further, climate plaintiffs have the potential to gain legal standing and 
mandate government action via the courts that activists lack. But even without receiving 
official acceptance by the judiciary, Juliana can keep climate justice at the forefront of 
public debate and even motivate legislative action to achieve their ultimate goal of 
preserving a stable climate system.  
Climate litigation is only growing; even Greta Thunberg is part of an 
international lawsuit (Harvey, 2020). If we can better understand how these cases, like 
activists, transform the cold, hard legal facts into compelling stories centered around 
people we can expand what we consider to be success for climate cases. This research 
contributes to the studies of climate activism and law by contextualizing Juliana within 
the literature behind ATL, tracing the trajectory of climate in the courts, extending 
analysis of Juliana to include its narrative aspects, and drawing preliminary links 
between the case and youth activists that demonstrate how both are re-centering their 
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